Recent Advances in Inaudible Adversarial Attack in Speaker Recognition and Multi-channel Speech Separation in Complicated Environments



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- Inaudible Adversarial Attack in Speaker Recognition
- Multi-channel Speech Separation in Complicated Environments

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- Multi-channel Speech Separation in Complicated Environments

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Adversarial Attacks in Speaker Recognition

- Spoofing attacks: reply, TTS, VC, etc *
- DNNs are also vulnerable to adversarial examples (e.g. image or speech related tasks) *
- **Adversarial examples**: *
 - Examples with small, intentional perturbations that cause a well-trained model make a false prediction *



Figures and samples are from Goodfellow 2014 [1] and Carlini 2018 [2].

[1] I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy, "Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples," arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572, 2014. [2] N. Carlini and D. Wagner, "Audio adversarial examples: targeted attacks on speech-to-text," in Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW). IEEE, 2018, pp. 1–7.

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Adversarial Attacks in Speaker Recognition

- **Performing Adversarial Attacks**
 - Goal of the attacker
 - Adversarial impersonation \rightarrow targeted attack (user authentication application)
 - Attack transforms a non-target trail (random spkr) into a target trail (target spkr) *
 - Attacker wants to usurp the identity of another person *
 - Adversarial evasion \rightarrow non-targeted attack (forensics, criminal investigation)
 - Attacks transform a target-trail (target spkr) into non-target (different spkr)
 - Attacker wants to avoid detection by ASV system *
 - **Knowledge of the attacker** •
 - White-box: has full knowledge of the system under attack *
 - Black-box: has no access to the victim model, generates adv. speech using another white-box system
 - Grey-box: has some information, but not statistical models
 - Methods of the generation of adversarial examples: FGSM, iterative FGSM, Carlini-Wagner... *

[3] F. Kreuk, Y. Adi, M. Cisse, and J. Keshet, "Fooling end-to-end speaker verification with adversarial examples," in IEEE ICASSP 2018, 2018, pp. 1962–1966. [4] G. Chen, S. Chen, L. Fan, X. Du, Z. Zhao, F. Song, and Y. Liu, "Who is real Bob? adversarial attacks on speaker recognition systems," ArXiv, vol. abs/1911.01840, 2019. [5] Z. Li, C. Shi, Y. Xie, J. Liu, B. Yuan, and Y. Chen, "Practical adversarial attacks against speaker recognition systems," in ACM HotMobile 2020, 2020, pp. 9–14. [6] Das, R.K., Tian, X., Kinnunen, T. and Li, H., 2020. The Attacker's Perspective on Automatic Speaker Verification: An Overview. in Interspeech 2020, pp.4213-4217. [7] Villalba, J., Zhang, Y. and Dehak, N., 2020. x-Vectors Meet Adversarial Attacks: Benchmarking Adversarial Robustness in Speaker Verification. in Interspeech 2020, pp.4233-4237. [8] Zhang, Y., Jiang, Z., Villalba, J. and Dehak, N., 2020. Black-box Attacks on Spoofing Countermeasures Using Transferability of Adversarial Examples. Proc. Interspeech 2020, pp.4238-4242. Northwestern *あままもも*

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Adversarial Attacks in Speaker Recognition

Defenses of adversarial attacks *

Improve the robustness of SV model against adversarial attacks

Adversarial regularization is proposed to protect end-to-end speaker verification system [9]. This mechanism aims at finding a worst spot around the current data point, and then optimize using this worst data point to derive a robust model.

Defense against adversarial attacks •

A passive defense method--spatial smoothing and another proactive method--adversarial training are studied to defend adversarial attacks for spoofing countermeasures [10].

Detection of adversarial examples *

Defend ASV systems against adversarial attacks with a separate detection network [11]. A VGG-like binary classification detector is introduced and demonstrated to be effective on detecting adversarial samples.

[9] Q. Wang, P. Guo, S. Sun, L. Xie, and J. H. Hansen, "Adversarial regularization for end-to-end robust speaker verification," in Interspeech 2019, 2019, pp. 4010–4014. [10] H. Wu, S. Liu, H. Meng, and H. yi Lee, "Defense against adversarial attacks on spoofing countermeasures of ASV," in IEEE ICASSP 2020, 2020, pp. 6564–6568. [11] Li, X., Li, N., Zhong, J., Wu, X., Liu, X., Su, D., Yu, D. and Meng, H., 2020. Investigating Robustness of Adversarial Samples Detection for Automatic Speaker Verification. in Interspeech 2020, pp.4233-4237.



- In our study, we aim to exploit this weakness to $\mathbf{\mathbf{x}}$ perform targeted adversarial attacks against speaker recognition system
- The aforementioned adversarial examples are $\mathbf{\mathbf{x}}$ mostly restricted to make a slight change of original signal in form of audio sampling points, without considering the human sound perceptibility
- Our aim: Generate inaudible adversarial \mathbf{x} perturbations for targeted attacking speaker recognition system on wave-level.
- Our approach: Leverage frequency masking [12]
 - Audible sound (random speaker) + another * louder audible sound (perturbation) \rightarrow inaudible sound (inaudible adv. example)
- Explore the targeted attacks on non-speech



An overview of the generation of adversarial examples based on frequency masking.

- - *
 - *

[12] Qing Wang, Pengcheng Guo, Lei Xie, Inaudible Adversarial Perturbations for Targeted Attack in Speaker Recognition, Interspeech2020 https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.10637

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Cons of previous adversarial perturbations:

Perturbations are small \rightarrow lower attack success rate Constrict noise by l_p norm \rightarrow easily detectable



Estimation of frequency masking threshold *

Step1: Identifications of maskers *

$$T[b(j), b(i)]/dB = \overline{P}_{x}[b(j)] + \Delta [b(j)] + SF[b(j), b(i)]$$

 $\mathbf{\mathbf{x}}$

 $T_G(i)/dB =$

 $P_{x}(k)/dB = 10 \log_{10} \left| \frac{1}{N} s_{x}(k) \right|^{2}$

b) Larger than absolute threshold

$$\bar{P}_{\chi}(\bar{k}) = 10\log_{10}\left[10^{\frac{\bar{P}_{\chi}(k-1)}{10}} + 10^{\frac{\bar{P}_{\chi}(k)}{10}} + 10^{\frac{\bar{P}_{\chi}(k+1)}{10}}\right]$$

a) Local maxima;

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STFT

PSD

3 Constraints

Smoothing

Step2: Calculation of individual masking thresholds

T[b(j), b(i)]: masker at *j*-th freq. contributes to the masking threshold on maskee at *i*-th freq.

Step3: Calculation of global masking threshold

$$10\log_{10}\left[10^{\frac{ATH(i)}{10}} + \sum_{j=1}^{N_{M}} 10^{\frac{[b(j),b(i)]}{10}}\right]$$

W. H. Abdulla, "Principles of psychoacoustics," mark. Springer, 2015, pp. 15-49.



Objective functions $L_{TH}(x,\delta) = \mathbb{E}_k \max\{\overline{P}_{\delta}(k) - T_{C}(k), 0\}$ $\min L(x, \delta, y') = L_{CE}(f(x + \delta), y') + \alpha \cdot L_{TH}(x, \delta)$ * detectable **Optimization procedure** \mathbf{x} Attack Stage 1: * $\delta \leftarrow clip_{\epsilon} \left(\delta - lr_1 \cdot sign(\nabla_{\delta} L_{CE}(f(x + \delta), y')) \right)$ Attack Stage 2: $\delta \leftarrow \delta - lr_2 \cdot \nabla_{\delta} L(x, \delta, y')$

- Cons of previous adversarial perturbations:
 - Perturbations are small \rightarrow lower attack success rate
 - Constrict noise by $l_p \text{ norm} \rightarrow \text{easily}$ detectable
- Pros of inaudible adversarial perturbations:
 Perturbations can be larger and inaudible
 Constrict function is consistent with psychoacoustic principle



Dataset

Aichall 1.

**	AISN	en-1:	*	R
	*	Original set: 10 female (F) and 10 male speakers (M), each with 100 utterances	**	*
	*	Attack target set: another 10 female (F') and 10 male speaker (M'), each with 100 utterances	*	÷
	*	Four test modes: M2M', M2F', F2M' and F2F'	**	۲ \ ۲
*	MUS	SAN (Music portion from MUSAN as the non-speech dataset):		
	*	200 pieces of western art music are cut into 1000 pieces of 6 seconds short segments		*
*	Roo	m Impulse Response and Noise Database		*
	*	Used for on-the-air attack		**

[14] Snyder, D., Garcia-Romero, D., Sell, G., Povey, D. and Khudanpur, S., 2018, April. X-vectors: Robust dnn embeddings for speaker recognition. In 2018 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP) (pp. 5329-5333). IEEE.
[15] Ravanelli, M. and Bengio, Y., 2018, December. Speaker recognition from raw waveform with sincnet. In 2018 IEEE Spoken Language Technology Workshop (SLT) (pp. 1021-1028). IEEE.

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aseline

White-box attack: x-vector system [13] On-the-air attack: SincNet system [14]

valuation metric

Attack success rate

 $Acc = N_s / N$

Perceptual evaluation of speech quality (PESQ)

Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)

Subjective listening



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- Experimental results and analysis
 - White-box attack (x-vector system) \mathbf{x}





White-box attack yields up to 98.5% attack success rate to arbitrary gender speaker targets with inaudible * adversarial perturbations

We can achieve up to 47.1% attack success rate in on-the-air attack * Lei Xie ASLP@NPU More demos: https://pengchengguo.github.io/inaudible-advex-for-sv/

On-the-air attack (SincNet system)

	M2M'	M2F'	F2M'	F2F'
1	4.8	3.9	4.5	3.7
2	47.1	45.2	42.1	41.6
ζ		(,))		
1				
2	(((())	





Larger perturbation by the proposed approach \mathbf{x}



M2M' -- Stage 1

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More demos: https://pengchengguo.github.io/inaudible-advex-for-sv/

M2M' -- Stage 2







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Experimental results \bigstar

White-box attack \bigstar



PESQ and SNR (dB) comparison of Attack Stage1 and Attack Stage2.

Subjective listener evaluation

	Preference (%)				
Attack Stage1	Neural	Attack Stage2	<i>p</i> -value		
11.33	20.00	68.67	0.0379		

Preference scores (%) of Attack Stage1 and Attack Stage2.

Non-speech targeted attack *

	Before Attack	Attack Stage1	Attack Stage2
Acc	0.00%	77.0%	91.5%
Sample1			
Sample2		((ا	(د

- **Conclusions** *
 - **

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[12] Qing Wang, Pengcheng Guo, Lei Xie, Inaudible Adversarial Perturbations for Targeted Attack in Speaker Recognition, Interspeech2020 https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.10637

Objective and subjective evaluations indicate that frequency masking based adversarial perturbations are more inaudible, even with larger absolute energies

Experiments on MUSAN corpus show that even non-speech can achieve a high targeted speaker attack success rate.



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Future Directions and Challenges

- More realistic scenarios: \checkmark
 - On-the-air attack
 - Black-box attack
- Defense/detection of adversarial attacks
- Also some other challenges: *
 - **Evaluation metrics?**
 - Standard dataset?
 - Any other attack scenario? *







- Inaudible Adversarial Attack in Speaker Recognition
- Multi-channel Speech Separation in Complicated Environments





Move to the Cocktail Party Problem



"One of our most important faculties is our ability to listen to, and follow, one speaker in the presence of others. This is such a common experience that we may take it for granted; we may call it 'the cocktail party problem'..." (Cherry' 57)



Towards Multi-Talker Speech Recognition

- Speech separation is a common practice to handle the speaker overlaps
- Multi-talker aware ASR \bigstar
 - MIMO-Speech, SpeakerBeam... \bigstar
- Front-end + Back-end
 - Beamforming, esp. Fixed Beamforming \bigstar
 - Mask-based Adaptive Beamforming *
 - Ad-hoc Speech Enhancement and Separation
- Speaker-independent Continuous Speech Separation (SI-CSS) \bigstar
- Injecting prior knowledge (bias) into speech separation \bigstar







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Low-latency Continuous Speech Separation

Extraction vs. Separation \mathbf{x}

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- Speech extraction usually has better performance upper bound * and is easier to joint train with other module
- But it usually suffers from the efficiency limitation and heavily ** depend on the bias signal
- **UFE**: Combining the advantageous from both [1]
 - Speech separation pre-separate the mixed signal **
 - Speech extraction further enhance the result **
 - Acceptable computation cost with low latency online processing **



Figure Credit: Zhuo Chen



- UFE System (Unmixing, Fixed-beam and Extraction) [1] \mathbf{x}
 - *M*-channel STFT of input speech mixture: $Y_{0,\dots,M-1} = \{Y_0, \dots, Y_{M-1}\}$ *
 - **Unmixing network (U)**: multi-channel TF mask $\mathbf{M}_{0,1} \in \mathbb{R}^{T \times F}$ estimation via PIT under Si-SNR loss \mathbf{x}

$$\mathcal{L} = -\max_{\phi \in \mathcal{P}} \sum_{(i,j) \in \phi} \operatorname{Si-SNR}(\mathbf{s}_i, \mathbf{x}_j), \qquad \mathbf{s}_i = \operatorname{iSTFT}(\mathbf{M}_i \odot \mathbf{Y}_0)$$

Sound Source Localization (SSL): estimate the spatial angle for *ith* speaker

$$\mathcal{D}_{\theta,i} = -\sum_{t,f} \mathbf{M}_{i,tf} \log \left(1 - \frac{|\mathbf{y}_{t,f}^{H} \mathbf{h}_{\theta,f}|^{2}}{1+\epsilon} \right)$$

Fixed beamformer (F) \mathbf{x}

$$b_{i,t,f} = \mathbf{w}_{i,f}^H \mathbf{y}_{t,f}, \ \mathbf{y}_{t,f} = [\mathbf{Y}_{0,tf}, \cdots, \mathbf{Y}_{M-1}]$$

Extraction Network (E): location-based speech extraction on each * selected beam

$$\mathbf{a}_{ heta,f} = rac{1}{P} \sum_{i,j \in \psi} \cos(\mathbf{o}_{ij,f} - \Delta_{ heta,ij,f}),$$

[1] Takuya Yoshioka, Zhuo Chen, Changliang Liu, Xiong Xiao, Hakan Erdogan, and Dimitrios Dimitriadis, "Low-latency speaker-independent continuous speech separation," ICASSP 2019





Fig. 1. Overview of the UFE system. \mathcal{F} , \mathcal{B} , \mathcal{A} and SSL denote short-time Fourier transform (STFT), fixed beamforming, angle feature computation and SSL algorithm, respectively. \mathbf{M}_{i}^{U} and \mathbf{M}_{i}^{E} represent the TF-masks of the *i*-th speaker generated by *unmixing* (U) and *extraction* (E) network. A_i and B_i^M denote the angle feature and the selected beam given the speaker direction θ_i . The *unmixing* and extraction model are trained independently.



- Advantages of the UFE system
 - Low latency as fixed beamformer used
 - Overcome the weak spatial cancellation issue for common fixed beamformer applications through additional speech extraction step
- Drawbacks of the UFE system: modularized optimization with sub-optimal performance
 - All components are optimized separately
 - * Speech unmixing and extraction are optimized with **signal reconstruction metric**
 - Sound localization is optimized with ML
 - * Beamformer is designed with **hand tuned criteria**



Proposed E2E-UFE: all components are optimized jointly via a unified network [2]

- The TF-masks generated by unmixing network is converted to **hidden representation** \mathbf{x}
- An attentional module between the mask-embedding and beamforming output, candidate directional ** features is applied to pick the corresponding beam and angle feature, which are passed to neural extraction module
 - Allow the gradients to propagate though the beam selection module, which was non-differentiable in * the original UFE
- Extraction network takes both beams and angle features as input, outputting two beams simultaneously
- All the outputting beams are **optimized jointly with PIT objective**, which avoids the permutation ambiguity \mathbf{x} when speakers are spatially close.
- With these updates, we ensure that the gradient from the top layer can pass to all sub-modules of the $\mathbf{\mathbf{x}}$ system, i.e. making the system **optimized in an end-to-end manner**, while keep the advantage of base model with low-latency processing

[2] Jian Wu, Zhuo Chen, Jinyu Li, Takuya Yoshioka, Zhili Tan, Ed Lin, Yi Luo, Lei Xie, AN END-TO-END ARCHITECTURE OF ONLINE MULTI-CHANNEL SPEECH SEPARATION, Interspeech2020 https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.03141



Proposed E2E-UFE •



Pre-separation (U) *

 $\mathbf{V}^{P}=\mathbf{E}\mathbf{W}_{p},$

 $\mathbf{V}^B = |\mathbf{B}|\mathbf{W}_b,$

Attentional beam & angle selection (F) $\mathbf{\mathbf{x}}$



$$\hat{\mathbf{B}}_h = \sum_b w_{h,b} \mathbf{B}_b.$$

Joint Extraction (E): Beam selection & wave reconstruction are optimized with one objective function *

$$\mathcal{L} = - \max_{\phi \in \mathcal{P}} \sum_{(i,j) \in \phi} \operatorname{Si-SNR}(\mathbf{s}_i, \mathbf{r}_j),$$

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Experiments

*	Tra	ining data	*	Fea	ture
	*	On-the-fly data simulation using Librispeech + three Microsoft's internal dataset	v	*	STF1
	*	Additional isotropic noise is used		*	cosl
	*	Overlapping ratio: 0.5 ~ 1.0		*	Ang
	*	Speaker angle: at least 20 degrees	*	Net	work
	*	Distance between speaker and array: at least 1m		*	U &
*	Eva	aluation data		*	Add
	*	Two dataset: <i>simu</i> and <i>semi-real</i>	*	Eva	luatio
	*	simu - simulated with <i>dev</i> set in Librispeech		*	WEF
	*	semi-real - simulated with real recordings		*	Offli
	*	Two overlapping ratio: 0.2~0.5 (OV35) & 0.5~1.0 (OV7)	5)		

- T: 32/16ms
- IPD pair: 1,4/2,5/3,6
- le feature: 1,0/2,0/3,0/4,0/5,0/6,0
- Configurations
- E: 3 Contextual LSTM layers with 512 nodes
- future context for uni-directional LSTMs
- on metric
- R
- ine & Online





Results *

		andation				Diock offini			
Method	simu OV35 OV75		semi-real OV35 OV75		Method (history) ov35	mu OV70	semi-real OV35 OV7(
Mixed Beam Clean Beam	67.40 10.67	52.40 10.56	70.92 20.34	57.63 19.71	UFE (2s) UFE (4s)	24.10 23.66	31.40 28.85	44.05 43.49	45.13 44.06
UFE	16.44	18.55	35.60	37.54	E2E-UFE (2s)	17.50	19.43	38.64	39.98
E2E-UFE	16.85	18.98	33.89	35.92	E2E-UFE (4s)	17.09	19.10	36.67	39.11

Simple FB (Mixed Beam) yielded a high WER even with oracle DoA while Clean Beam sets the upper bound \mathbf{x}

Offline evaluation

- The proposed E2E-UFE achieved comparable performance as the original UFE for the simulated data set, while * demonstrating a clear performance advantage in *semi-real set*
- E2E- UFE shows robustness for different look-back configurations (a 2s or 4s history context), achieving slightly worse * results than for the offline evaluation on both datasets
- Original UFE resulted in a much larger performance degradation for the online evaluation **
- On the *semi-real* set, E2E-UPE brought about a 12.47% average relative WER reduction compared with UFE using a 2 s history context, while on the *simu* set, the relative reduction increases to 29.71%

[2] Jian Wu, Zhuo Chen, Jinyu Li, Takuya Yoshioka, Zhili Tan, Ed Lin, Yi Luo, Lei Xie, AN END-TO-END ARCHITECTURE OF ONLINE MULTI-CHANNEL SPEECH SEPARATION, Interspeech2020 https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.03141

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Block online evaluation





DCUNET Front-end for Multi-channel ASR

- Adopt the architecture of deep complex Unet (DCUnet) a * powerful complex-valued Unet-structured speech enhancement model - as the front-end of multi-channel acoustic model
- Integrate them in a multi-task learning (MTL) framework along with cascaded framework
 - **DCUnet-MTL** \mathbf{x}
 - **DCUnet-CAS** **
- Experiments: 1000-hours real-world XiaoMi smart speaker data * with echoes
 - DCUnet-MTL method brings 12.2% relative CER reduction * compared with the traditional approach with array processing + single-channel acoustic model
 - It also achieves superior performance over the recently * proposed neural beamforming method

[3] Yuxiang Kong, Jian Wu, Quandong Wang, Peng Gao, Weiji Zhuang, Yujun Wang, Lei Xie, Multi-Channel Automatic Speech Recognition Using Deep Complex Unet, IEEE SLT2021, https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.09081 Lei Xie ASLP@NPU



Model

Baseline **NNFB DCUnet-MTL DCUnet-CAS**

Table 4. CER (%) comparison on different subsets

16.4919.6714.1612.3615.0815.8018.6113.8212.4514.67 14.6816.1112.5411.1813.23 15.1117.5512.9111.6413.82		Echoed	<5 dB	[5,15) dB	\geqslant 15 dB	Total
15.8018.6113.8212.4514.6714.6816.1112.5411.1813.2315.1117.5512.9111.6413.82		16.49	19.67	14.16	12.36	15.08
14.6816.1112.5411.1813.23 15.1117.5512.9111.6413.82		15.80	18.61	13.82	12.45	14.67
15.11 17.55 12.91 11.64 13.82	,	14.68	16.11	12.54	11.18	13.23
		15.11	17.55	12.91	11.64	13.82

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- **Motivation** **
 - Real-world environment: speech overlapping, directional/isotropic noise and reverberation may exist together *
 - Prior arts: Direct separation on noisy mixtures, cascaded/two-stage (enhancement-separation, separation-• enhancement), recursive separation...
 - **E2E-UFE**[2] and **DCCRN**[4] show great potential on multi-channel separation and single-channel enhancement
- Contribution **
 - We propose an offline processing neural network for simultaneous speech Dereverberation, Enhancement and \bullet Separation (DESNet)
 - We combine the DNN-WPE, E2E-UFE and DCCRN organically together with differentiable STFT (iSTFT) to form an end-to-end manner
- We evaluate the performance of the proposed model *
 - Three scenarios: speech enhancement (SE), clean speech separation (CSS) and noisy speech separation (NSS) **
 - Two categories: dereverberated and non-dereverberated

[2] Jian Wu, Zhuo Chen, Jinyu Li, Takuya Yoshioka, Zhili Tan, Ed Lin, Yi Luo, Lei Xie, AN END-TO-END ARCHITECTURE OF ONLINE MULTI-CHANNEL SPEECH SEPARATION, Interspeech2020 https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.03141 [4] Yanxin Hu, Yun Liu, Shubo Lv, Mengtao Xing, Shimin Zhang, Yihui Fu, Jian Wu, Bihong Zhang, Lei Xie, DCCRN: Deep Complex Convolution Recurrent Network for Phase-Aware Speech Enhancement, Interspeech2020, October 25-29, Shanghai, China https://arxiv.org/abs/2008.00264

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Dereverberation: DNN-WPE [5]

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$$\mathbf{y}_{d\mathrm{rv},t,f}' = \mathbf{y}_{t,f} - \sum_{k=0}^{K-1} \mathbf{G}_{f,k}^{H} \mathbf{y}_{t-\Delta-k,f}$$
 $= \mathbf{y}_{t,f} - \mathbf{G}_{f}^{H} \overline{\mathbf{y}_{t-\Delta,f}},$
 $\mathbf{R}_{f} = \sum_{t} \frac{\mathbf{y}_{t-\Delta,f} \mathbf{y}_{t,f}^{H}}{\Lambda_{t,f}},$
 $\mathbf{r}_{f} = \sum_{t} \frac{\overline{\mathbf{y}_{t-\Delta,f}} \mathbf{y}_{t,f}^{H}}{\Lambda_{t,f}},$
 $\mathbf{G}_{f} = \mathbf{R}_{f}^{-1} \mathbf{r}_{f}.$

* Angle Feature and Fixed Beamforming $\mathbf{b}_{i,f} = \mathbf{w}_{i,f}^H \mathbf{Y}_{drv,f}'$, $\mathbf{a}_{ heta,f} =$

[2] Yihui Fu, Jian Wu, Yanxin Hu, Mengtao Xing, Lei Xie, DESNet: A Multi-channel Network for Simultaneous Speech Dereverberation, Enhancement and Separation, IEEE SLT2021, <u>https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.02131</u>
[5] Keisuke Kinoshita, Marc Delcroix, Haeyong Kwon, Takuma Mori, and Tomohiro Nakatani, "Neural network-based spectrum estimation for online wpe dere- verberation.," in Interspeech, 2017, pp. 384–388.

$$\mathbf{\Lambda}_m = \mathrm{NN}(|\mathbf{Y}_m|),$$

$$\mathbf{\Lambda} = \sum_m \mathbf{\Lambda}_m / M$$

$$=\sum_{m,n\in\psi}\cos(\mathbf{o}_{mn,f}-\mathbf{r}_{\theta,mn,f})/P$$



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Speech Unmixing by DCCRN [3]

- A better network can benefit the following selection of the angle and beam features, as well as assist the speech extraction for a better estimation of the final masks
- DCCRN follows the UNet structure, but using complex-valued convolutional encoders/decoders and real/imaginary LSTMs to model the context dependency.

$$\begin{split} \mathbf{W} & \circledast \mathbf{Y} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{W}_r \\ \mathbf{W}_i \end{bmatrix} & \circledast \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{Y}_r \\ \mathbf{Y}_i \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{W}_r * \mathbf{Y}_r - \mathbf{W}_i * \mathbf{Y}_i \\ \mathbf{W}_r * \mathbf{Y}_i + \mathbf{W}_i * \mathbf{Y}_r \end{bmatrix} \\ \mathbf{M}_{c,\text{mag}} &= anh(\sqrt{\mathbf{H}_{c,r}^2 + \mathbf{H}_{c,i}^2}), \\ \mathbf{M}_{c,\text{pha}} &= rctan2(\mathbf{H}_{c,i}, \mathbf{H}_{c,r}). \end{split}$$

$$\mathbf{Y}_{c}^{U} = \mathbf{M}_{c}^{U} \odot \mathbf{Y}_{\mathrm{drv},0}^{\prime}$$

[4] Yanxin Hu, Yun Liu, Shubo Lv, Mengtao Xing, Shimin Zhang, Yihui Fu, Jian Wu, Bihong Zhang, Lei Xie, DCCRN: Deep Complex Convolution Recurrent Network for Phase-Aware Speech Enhancement, Interspeech2020, October 25-29, Shanghai, China <u>https://arxiv.org/abs/2008.00264</u>

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Demo: Speech Enhancement using DCCRN



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More samples : <u>https://huyanxin.github.io/DeepComplexCRN/</u>



Street-enh





Canteen-enh





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Attentional Feature Selection \bigstar

 $\mathbf{V}_{c}^{U} = |\mathbf{M}_{c}^{U}|\mathbf{W}_{p},$

 $\mathbf{V}_{\theta}^{A} = \mathbf{A}_{\theta} \mathbf{W}_{a},$

$$\begin{split} s_{c,\theta,t} &= (\sqrt{D})^{-1} \left(\mathbf{V}_{c,t}^U \right)^T \mathbf{V}_{\theta,t}^A. \\ \hat{s}_{c,\theta} &= (T)^{-1} \sum_t s_{c,\theta,t}, \\ w_{c,\theta} &= \text{softmax}_{\theta}(\hat{s}_{c,\theta}). \end{split} \quad \hat{\mathbf{A}}_c = \sum_{\theta} w_{c,\theta} \mathbf{A}_{\theta}. \end{split}$$

- **Speech Extraction** \bigstar
 - Concatenate unmixed speech and attentional features along frequency dimension to estimate the * final enhanced and separated mask of two speakers





Loss Function \mathbf{x}

 $\text{SI-SNR}(\mathbf{s}_i, \mathbf{x}_j) = 20 \log_{10} \frac{\|\boldsymbol{\alpha} \cdot \mathbf{x}_j\|}{\|\mathbf{s}_i - \boldsymbol{\alpha} \cdot \mathbf{x}_j\|}$

Proposed **Symphonic Loss**: the loss calculation of each training chunk in one mini-batch is different * If current mixture chunk contains one speaker, namely in SE track, we only optimize the first branch

- of the network
- For NSS and CSS tracks, we optimize both branches of the network using permutation invariant training (PIT):

$$\mathcal{L} = -\max_{\phi \in \mathcal{P}} \sum_{(i,j) \in \phi} \operatorname{Si-SNR}(\mathbf{s}_i, \mathbf{x}_j) / N_{\mathcal{P}}$$

Table 1. SNR (SDR) range (dB) in each stage.										
Training Enoch	SE	CSS	NSS							
Hanning Epoch	5L	000	SE	SS						
$1 \sim 5$	[5, 10]	[-2, 2]	×	×						
$6 \sim 10$	[0, 10]	×	[15, 20]	[-2, 2]						
$11 \sim 15$	[-2, 10]	×	[10, 20]	[-4, 4]						
$16 \sim 20$	[-5, 10]	×	[5, 20]	[-5, 5]						

Staged SNR Strategy *



Experiments

*	Tra	ining & evaluation data	*	Fea	ture
	*	On-the-fly data simulation using Librispeech + DNS		*	STFT:
		noise		***	Beam
	*	Additional isotropic noise is used		*	Angle
	*	Sound source angle : at least 20 $^\circ$	*	Net	work C
	*	Source-Mic distance: 1-5m		*	Atten
	*	RT60: 0.1-0.5s		*	DCCR
	*	Topological structure : 4 mics with 5cm radius		**	Extrac
*	Sce	nario	*	Eva	luation
	*	Speech enhancement (SE)		***	PESQ
	*	Clean source separation (CSS)		***	Si-SNI
	*	Noisy source separation (NSS)			

- 32/16ms
- number: 18
- e feature number: 36
- Configurations
- tion embedding size: 257
- N: 6 layers complex CNN
- ction: 3 layers LSTM with 512 hidden size
- metric
- for SE
- R for CSS and NSS



Results \mathbf{x}

Table 2. Results of non-dereverberated SE and SS.													
Model	SE (PESQ)					CSS (SI-SNR (dB))				NSS (SI-SNR (dB))			
SNR (SDR)	-5	0	5	10	Avg.	-5	-2	0	Avg.	-5	-2	0	Avg.
Mixed	1.51	1.87	2.22	2.57	2.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.63	-0.88	-0.76	-1.09
CACGMM	2.14	2.40	2.69	2.88	2.53	4.50	6.16	6.48	5.71	1.72	4.08	4.46	3.42
Proposed DESNet	2.55	2.87	3.17	3.41	3.00	10.18	9.98	9.78	9.98	7.16	7.73	7.77	7.55
 Staged SNR 	2.51	2.87	3.16	3.40	2.99	9.88	8.54	7.87	8.76	7.16	6.65	6.19	6.67
 Symphonic Loss 	2.36	2.73	3.06	3.33	2.87	9.61	9.40	9.26	9.42	6.70	7.31	7.31	7.11
- BF Feature	2.29	2.65	2.97	3.23	2.79	8.77	8.65	8.44	8.62	5.84	6.32	6.31	6.16
DCCRN	2.25	2.61	2.94	3.20	2.75	7.78	6.04	5.37	6.40	5.73	4.62	4.07	4.81
Conv-TasNet	2.00	2.29	2.53	2.71	2.38	6.03	6.67	6.72	6.47	3.93	5.09	5.23	4.75
DPRNN	2.22	2.55	2.84	3.09	2.68	9.09	9.36	9.32	9.26	6.37	7.32	7.42	7.04
FasNet	2.24	2.58	2.89	3.14	2.71	9.42	9.35	9.02	9.26	6.91	7.63	7.41	7.32
			Table	3. Resi	ilts of d	ereverbe	rated SI	E and SS	5.				
Model		S	E (PES	O)		С	SS (SI-S	SNR (dF	3))	N	ASS (SI-	SNR (dł	3))
SNR (SDR)	-5	0	5	10	Avg.	-5	-2	0	Avg.	-5	-2	0	Ävg.
Mixed	1.41	1.71	2.02	2.31	1.86	-1.38	-0.75	-0.64	-0.92	-2.63	-1.54	-1.35	-1.84
CACGMM	2.09	2.36	2.63	2.83	2.48	3.97	5.54	5.85	5.12	1.57	3.90	4.27	3.25
Proposed DESNet	2.36	2.65	2.90	3.12	2.76	8.07	8.18	8.14	8.13	6.38	6.65	6.50	6.51
 Staged SNR 	2.26	2.57	2.84	3.06	2.68	7.96	8.14	8.03	8.04	5.56	6.36	6.18	6.03
 Symphonic Loss 	2.32	2.63	2.89	3.11	2.74	7.74	7.88	7.42	7.68	5.68	6.45	6.50	6.21
- DNN-WPE	2.17	2.49	2.77	3.01	2.61	7.36	7.66	7.59	7.54	5.20	5.68	5.65	5.51
WPE-DCCRN	2.16	2.49	2.78	3.00	2.61	6.64	6.09	5.77	6.17	5.16	5.07	4.61	4.95

- In both non-dereverberated and dereberberated SE and SS scenarios, DESNet suppress CACGMM, DCCRN and time \mathbf{x} domain approaches including Conv-Tasnet, DPRNN and FasNet
- Staged SNR, symphonic loss and BF Feature are effective for better enhancement and separation performance •
- The learnt attentional weight fits the actual speaker's direction perfectly •
- Future work: optimizing speech dereverberation, enhancement and separation with acoustic model to further improve * the speech recognition accuracy in real environment scenarios



Fig. 4. Example of the learnt weights on angle feature in a two-speaker mixture utterance.



Demo: DesNet



[2] Yihui Fu, Jian Wu, Yanxin Hu, Mengtao Xing, Lei Xie, DESNet: A Multi-channel Network for Simultaneous Speech Dereverberation, Enhancement and Separation, IEEE SLT2021, <u>https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.02131</u>

More demos: https://felixfuyihui.github.io/DesNet_Demo/

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Thanks!



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